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ABSTRACT Monterey, California ,
In this thesis a Lanchester-Type model of combat with
logistics considerations is presented. The combat effective-
ness of each force is related to its supply. Four basic
groups of force supplies are considered: food (all goods
used whether or not combat is in progress); ammo (goods used
only in combat activity); fuel (goods required for mobility);
and capital goods, which are used to increase or replace
the capacity of the logistics pipeline. Lanchester attrition-
rate coefficients are considered to be functions of the level
of food and ammo supplies.
In the model, each opponent has a main battle force, a
reserve force, a logistics pipeline defense force, and a force
which may attack the other side's logistic pipeline. Differ-
ential equations for the combat dynamics are derived, and
some possible objectives and battle termination conditions
are suggested.
An example of use of the model is given, and some
analytical techniques for studying the model are discussed.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. BACKGROUND ON LANCHESTER-TYPE MODELS OF WARFARE
During World War I a British aeronautical engineer, F. W.
Lanchester, postulated a differential equation model of
combat. His reason for doing this was to explain the prin-
ciple of concentration of firepower. Using his model one
can study and analyze mathematically the process of combat
attrition. Others have subsequently expanded and developed
Lanchester 's equations into what has become known as Lanchester-
Type models of combat. Essentially, a Lanchester-Type model
of combat is a set of differential equations which describe
mathematically the interactions of opposing combat forces.
When this set of equations is solved for force levels as a
function of time, the conditions necessary for one force to
win (given a definition of winning, such as driving the
opposing force level to zero) may be obtained.
Lanchester-Type models are deterministic in the sense
that given a set of initial conditions, the winning force is
known with certainty. This is in contrast with a stochastic
model in which given the same set of initial conditions, a
probability of winning may be determined for each force; i.e.,
the outcome (winner) is not known with certainty. The model
developed in this thesis is a deterministic model.
The usefulness of a Lanchester-Type model is that such
a model can give some insight into the over-all dynamics of
a combat situation. Using a Lanchester model, one may learn,
u
for example, which of a set of possible tactics appear to be
"better" in a given situation. "Better" could be thought of
in terms of winning a battle in a shorter period of time, or
winning a battle while suffering less casualties. One may
also learn why a particular tactic is successful, by study-
ing the mathematical formulation of the combat dynamics. In
this light, a simple Lanchester model is much more useful
than a detailed simulation model of combat, in which the
major cause-and-ef fect relationships may not be readily
apparent to the user. In addition, a Lanchester model is
generally more responsive; that is, numerical answers are
obtained usually with significantly less time and effort
than with a detailed simulation model.
B. INCORPORATION OF LOGISTICS CONSIDERATIONS INTO
LANCHESTER FORMULATIONS
It has long been known that logistics, or supply lines,
or lines of communication, are vital to a successful military
campaign strategy. Since the time of Mahan with his writings
on sea power, [Ref. 1] attempts have been made to qualitatively
assess the value and importance of the ability to provide
support to combat forces. It has been only recently, however,
that any attempt to model, in a quantitiative and analytic
way, the logistics element of combat has been made. Moglewer
and Payne [Ref. 2] have studied the problem of two forces,
one of which has a supply pipeline, as a two-person zero-sum
differential game. Some ideas presented in their paper are
expanded upon in this thesis. The model developed here is
broader in scope than that of Moglewer and Payne. [Ref. 2]
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I I . ANALYSIS OF LOGIST I CS EFFECTS ON FORCE CAPABILITIES
A. LANCHESTER'S LINEAR LAW, SQUARE LAW AND ATTRITION-RATE
COEFFICIENTS
From classical Lanchester theory, two "laws" have evolved:
the "square law" and "linear law" of combat attrition.
The "square law" is derived from the following scenario.
Suppose two forces, X and Y, are engaged in combat with each
other. Let X(t) represent the number of men in the X force
at time t, and Y(t) represent the number of men in the Y
force at time t. Assume that the rate at which the X force
inflicts casualties on the Y force is proportional to the
number of men in the X force; and that a similar attrition
process occurs for the X force which is proportional to the
number of men in the Y force. The constants of proportionality
need not be the same. Mathematically, the rate of change of
the X force is equal, in magnitude, to the number of Y at
time (t) times the constant of proportionality. Since Y(t)
is non-negative, and the constant of proportionality is, by
convention, positive, the right hand side of the equation
carries a minus sign, because X(t) is decreasing with time
M p dX(t) .(1,e
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The above two equations describe the combat dynamics. If
these equations are rewritten as
dX(t) aY(t)
dY(t) bX(t)
and if we let X(t=o) = Xo , and Y(t=o) = Yo , we readily obtain
b(Xo2 - X(t) 2 ) = a(Yo2 - Y(t) 2 ). The appearance of the force
levels as square terms gives the label "square law".
If the above scenario is modified such that the rate of








Rewriting these equations as before, and solving, we obtain
b(Xo-X(t)) = a(Yo - Y(t)). This is known as the linear law.
In the above two models, the constants of proportionality
a and b are commonly known as attrition rate coefficients.
These constants express the strength, or kill capability, of
one force against the other. If a is larger than b, for
example, it means that the Y force has more kill capability




B. BATTLE TERMINATION CONDITIONS
The above models are often analyzed in terras of a "fight
to the finish" which means the battle continues until either
X(t) = or Y(t) = (or possibly both at the same time).
The events X(t) = and Y(t) = are the battle termination
conditions. There exist an infinite number of possible
events from which one might choose a battle termination con-
dition, or set of conditions. Few, if any, real battles
result in one hundred percent casualties being suffered by
either force. Thus, analysis of real situations might be
accomplished using battle termination conditions such as
X(t) = 0.8 Xo or Y(t) = 0.8 Yo ; that is the battle continues
until either X or Y suffers twenty percent casualities. The
force which suffers twenty percent casualties then is said to
lose the battle. Having chosen the battle termination con-
ditions, one may determine conditions on Xo , Yo , a, and b
which guarantee that X or Y win.
C. FACTORS WHICH AFFECT THE LANCHESTER ATTRITION-RATE
COEFFICIENTS
It was implicitly assumed in the above models that the
attrition-rate coefficients a and b were constants. This
assumption makes the differential equations easy to solve;
however, there is no reason why the kill capability (which
the attrition-rate coefficient represents) of a force should
remain constant over the course of a battle. In fact, kill
capability could depend on such factors as range, weather,
visibility, discipline and morale, supply inventories, etc.
9
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which vary with time. In order to study the effects of such
factors on combat processes, one can extend the basic
Lanchester models given above by considering variable
attrition-rate coefficients. Solutions to these extended
equations are, in general, much more complicated than those
to constant coefficient equations. Moreover, it is the
exception rather than the rule that such a solution can be
expressed in terms of any tabulated functions.
Attempts to define, and quantify some of the factors
affecting the attrition-rate coefficients exist in the open
literature. In 1953, H. R. Weiss noted several deficiencies
in original Lanchester theory [Ref. 3]. In 1957, he proposed
some modifications to overcome some of these deficiencies,
among which he included a range dependent attrition-rate
coefficient [Ref. 4]. Brackney in 1959 addressed the effect
of enemy force size on target acquisition times and showed
that this dependence on force size can determine the
attrition process (whether square law or linear law) [Ref. 5]
However in the models studied above, it is usually assumed
that neither force has any logistics limitations. This means
infinite sources of ammunition are available if required to
finish the battle. It is the purpose of this thesis to
formulate a model in which logistics and supply levels are
treated explicitly in a realistic, yet reasonably simple,
manner. This is done by developing attrition-rate coefficients
which are functions of supply levels. For simplicity,
effects from other factors (such as those discussed above)
10
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on attrition-rate coefficients will be ignored. In a
generalized model of combat, effects from all of these factors
should be considered.
These factors could be considered to act independently
of each other, and therefore the generalized attrition-rate
coefficient could be taken as a product of factors (each of
which could itself be a function of input variables and time).
For example, if the effects of discipline and morale were
determined to be some function of force levels and time,
say a,(X,Y,t), and the effects of supply levels were some
other function, a (X,Y,t) then the composite function
a(X,Y,t) - a,(X,Y,t) • a (X,Y,t) would be a product of the
discipline function and supply function.
One might argue, however, that if supplies were drast-
ically low, discipline could weaken as a result. In the
model, however, if the low supply level were reflected in
a (X,Y,t) being close to or equal to zero, it would not
matter what value a,(X,Y,t) were to have; a(X,Y,t) would be
at or close to zero anyway. In other words, a perfectly
disciplined force cannot overcome a lack of ammunition
available to use against an enemy, and thus a force with a
weakened discipline could do no worse.
D. ANALYSIS OF LOGISTIC SUPPORT AND SUPPLY LEVELS
The idea that logistic support is vital to the success
of military operations is, of course, not new. Karl von
Clausewitz in his classical writings states that in modern
wars, "arrangements for subsistence shall be on an adequate
11

scale. "[Ref. 6] In 1807 Napoleon defined the secret of
warfare as the art of maintaining one's own communications
and gaining possession of the enemy ' s
.
[Ref
. 7] The Russian
general Denis Davidov in his essay on partisan war states
this type of warfare (partisan) "is concerned with the entire
area which separates the enemy from his operational base"
and its objectives are "to cut the communications lines,
destroy all units and wagons wanting to join up with him,
inflict surprise blows on the enemy left without food and
cartridges and at the same time block his retreat ... "[Ref . 7]
More well-known, especially in Navy circles, are the principles
laid down in Mahan's writings on sea power. In particular,
he said: "the most important of strategic lines are those
which concern the communications. Communications dominate
war. This has peculiar force on shore, because an army is
immediately dependent on supplies frequently renewed. It
can endure a brief interruption much less readily than
a fleet can. . . "[Ref. 1]
In recent history, perhaps the best example of putting
this principle of severing an army's communication lines is
the United States forces landing at Inchon Korea in September
of 1950. The purpose of this landing was to capture Seoul.
Gen. MacArthur's argument for this operation was that
seizure of Inchon and Seoul would cut the enemy's supply
line and seal off the entire southern Korea Peninsula. The
vulnerability of the enemy was his supply position. The
enemy's supply lines from the north converged on Seoul; from
12

Seoul they radiated to the south. By seizing Seoul, the enemy's
supply system would be completely paralyzed. This in turn
would paralyze the fighting power of the troops. Without
munitions and food they would soon be helpless, and disorgan-
ized, and could easily be over-powered by smaller, but well
supplied troops. [Ref. 8] That the Inchon landing was success-
ful, and the objective accomplished, is well known.
Thus, the situation in Korea is a clear example where
application of Lanchester theory, without logistic consider-
ations, would predict the enemy to be the winner simply
because of his vast numerical superiority. Because logistics
are such a vital factor in warfare, both in theory and in
practice, it seems necessary that logistics considerations
be included in any realistic applications of Lanchester-Type
models of combat.
In order to incorporate logistic support into a mathema-
tical model, an analysis of the concept of logistic support
must be made. In the broadest sense, logistic support is
the availability, transportation, storage and final
distribution of all material goods for the combat forces.
The availability of material goods, for the purposes of the
model developed in this thesis, will be thought of as the
basic industrial capacity or production capacity of goods in
the homeland, and will be treated as unconstrained. The
transportation
,
storage and final distribution of these goods
from the homeland to the combat area will be called the
pipeline
. The total amount of goods which can be delivered
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to the combat forces over a given period of time is bounded by
the pipeline capacity.
Numerous types of goods and supplies are required to
support the modern combat force. Army field manual FM - 101 -
10-1 breaks logistic support down into ten classes, each
class having sub-classifications. The supply classes and
elements of each are presented in tables. This classifi-
cation system is designed for the peacetime as well as wartime
army, however, and therefore includes many items which are
irrelevant for purposes of a model of combat.
Certain supplies are necessary for the day to day oper-
ations of forces, independent of whether combat is in progress
or not. Among these are food; administrative support items;
fuel for power generators, non-combat transportation, stoves;
etc; clothing; and maintenance items. For convenience, this
classification of supplies which are used independent of the
combat situation will be labeled "food".
Another group of supplies is required only during combat.
Items included are ammunition; fuel for weapons systems such
as tanks and aircraft; medical supplies; and replacement
parts and equipment such as rifles, tubes for artillery
weapons, etc. This group of supplies required only for combat
operations will be called "ammo".
A third class of material goods is necessary for provid-
ing mobility to the forces, whether or not combat is in
progress. These supplies are consumed only in advancing or
retreating; and do not include supplies used in the local
14

transportation requirements of a stationary force whether
engaged in combat or not. The predominant element in this
class is, of course, motor fuel. Accordingly, this classifi-
cation is termed "fuel."
The fourth and last group of goods to be included in
this model is that of investment-type goods. This type of
material is used to expand or replace the pipeline capacity
of the force. Included would be such items as building
material, building equipment, transportation equipment, and
materials handling equipment. Supplies required for the
day-to-day operation of the pipeline are not included here;
they are included in "food". This group is composed
primarily of capital goods; thus it will be called "capital".
In summary, let us consider all supplies to be in four groups:
Food: (all items consumed independent of combat
and/or mobility.)
Ammo: (all items consumed only by engaging in
combat
)
Fuel: (items consumed only by engaging in a
major movement such as complete force
withdrawal or advance)
Capital: (items used to increase or replace the
pipeline capacity)
Since mobility will not be a factor in the model developed
in this thesis, the group labelled fuel will not be considered
further.
E. COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS AS A FUNCTION OF SUPPLY LEVELS
In order to develop functional expressions for combat
effectiveness in terms of supply levels, the utilization of
15

each of the groups of supplies must be considered. That is,
the combat effectiveness with no supply, "normal" supply, and
"over supply", as well as the trend of combat effectiveness
with increasing supply levels at each of these supply levels
(zero, normal, over supply) should be ascertained. Precise
determination of the effectiveness in terms of supply levels
is a separate operations research problem in itself. In at
least one model of combat [Ref. 9] combat effectiveness is
calculated as an index of firepower. This index is tabulated
for different levels of supply.
For the model developed in this thesis, a continuous
function of combat effectiveness in terms of supply level is
developed from the current doctrine contained in the U.S. Army
Field Manual 101-10-1. Paragraph 5.9 of this manual, titled
"ammunition Supply Levels" is quoted in part: "levels of
ammunition supply are normally expressed as days of supply
for each theater of operations. Available ammunition assets
then are announced as available supply rates (ASR) ; as tactical
experience is gained, the required supply rate (RSR) is
computed. The ammunition logistics supply system relates ASR
to RSR so that a desirable balance of reserves is maintained.
Major commanders will desire to maintain a planned level of
supply as the minimum level of reserves. To change this level
of supply by increasing the level of receipts requires a




Similar reasoning could be applied to food supply levels
Certainly it is desirable to maintain some minimum level of
reserves of food simply in order to preserve morale and
discipline.
From the above discussion, the following assumptions
can be made concerning the effect of ammunition supplies on
combat effectiveness.
Al . A supply level of zero implies zero effectiveness.
A2. As supplies increase toward the minimum reserve level,
effectiveness increases slowly, because of the comman-
ders unwillingness to expend ammo below this minimum
level
.
A3. As supplies increase above the minimum supply level,
effectiveness will increase rapidly.
A4. As supplies continue to increase toward over-supply,
effectiveness will increase more and more slowly, be-
cause the large supplies may become almost a burden,
and supplies become sufficient to maintain the max-
imum sustained firing rates.
Figure 1 depicts a curve of combat effectiveness versus
supply level for ammo which was constructed from these
assumptions
.
Assumptions A2 , A3 and A4 are reasonable to apply to
food supplies. The applicability of assumption Al to this
model would depend on the proposed use of the model. For
example, to model a campaign which took place over several
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reduce military effectiveness to zero or at least a very low
level. If the scenario were that of a battle whose duration
would be measured in days or hours, the effect of no food
supplies would not be nearly so drastic. In such a case,
assumption Al might have to be modified; however in a battle
of short duration, combat effectiveness would probably not
depend very heavily on food supply levels as compared to
its dependence on ammo supply levels; in that case food
supply levels could be ignored in the model. For purposes
of this thesis, therefore, it will be assumed that if food
supply levels are significant to combat effectiveness, the
relationship will be the same as for ammo, (see figure 1)
From the above discussion, and from the figure, it is
apparent that the general form of the curve is an "S" shape.
There are many functions which can be made to take the form
of this curve; as noted previously, the precise determination
of the functional relationship is a separate problem in
itself. For purposes of simplicity and mathematical con-
venience, a function of the form f(s) = K(l-e ) will be
used, where f(s) is the Lanchester attrition-rate coefficient,
s is supply level, a is a shape parameter which is determined
by the sensitivity of effectiveness to changes in supply
levels. The k is constant determined by maximum effective-
ness. This function has the following useful properties:
1) f(o) =
2) lim f(s) = K i.e., effectiveness as a function of
s-*-°°
supply level cannot increase above some upper bound.
19

3) It is both continuous and dif f erentiable
.
Investment supplies have no direct influence on combat
effectiveness. The only purpose for considering this group
of supplies in this model is that such goods are required to
increase the capacity of the logistics pipeline, or to
replace capacity lost by damage from the enemy. In order to
obtain these investment goods in the theater of operations,
however, part of the existing pipeline capacity must be
utilized, thereby decreasing the available capacity for food
and ammo. This reduced capacity will then have an effect
on supply levels of food and ammo, and therefore on combat
effectiveness. This effect will be discussed in more detail
in the steady state analysis of the model.
20

III. FORMULATION OF THE MODEL WITH
LOGISTICS EFFECTS
A. MODEL SCENARIO
Two major combatants, X and Y, are engaged in a campaign.
Each combatant has a main battle force, a reserve force, and
a special force which can attack the other combatant's logis-
tics pipeline, and a pipeline defense force. Pipeline defen-
ders may engage, and be engaged by, pipeline attackers.
Pipeline terminations are at the location of the respective
combatants reserve force location, which is a secure area.
Thus supplies which are delivered through the pipeline are
subject only to use but not to attack or enemy damage. Each
force (main battle, pipeline attackers and pipeline defenders)
may be reinforced by reserves at rates which have a maximum
value; similarly each of the forces may withdraw to the re-
serve position at rates which have a maximum value. All
forces consume food at the same rate; ammo is consumed only
by the main battle and pipeline attackers and defenders.
The objective of each combatant commander is to annihilate
the other combatant or reduce its effectiveness to zero.
Decisions available to each commander are force allocations
and supply allocation. Force allocations decisions are
made by reinforcing or withdrawing troops in combat; pipeline
allocations are made by deciding the proportion of pipeline
capacity to be utilized for each of the supply groups: food,
ammo and investment. A graphic representation of this is









B. DERIVATION OF DIFFERENTIAL EQUATIONS
. 1 . List of Variables and Coefficients
The differential equations describing the dynamics of
the model are developed below. The following list of
variables and coefficients is presented for clarity:
Xl(t) = main battle force level of X at time t
X2(t) = reserve force level of X at time t
X3(t) = pipeline defense force level of X at time t
X4(t) = pipeline attack force level of X at time t
Yl(t) = main battle force level of Y at time t
Y2(t) = reserve force level of Y at time t
Y3(t) = pipeline defense force level of Y at time t
Y4(t) = pipeline attack force level of Y at time t
P(t) = pipeline capacity of X at time t (tons/day)
Q(t) = pipeline capacity of Y at time t (tons/day)
Sxa(t) = X's supply level of ammo at time t
Sxf(t) = X's supply level of food at time t
Sxc(t) = X's supply level of investment at time t
Sya(t) = Y's supply level of ammo at time t
Syf(t) = Y's supply level of food at time t
Syc(t) = Y's supply level of investment at time t
Cxa = X's consumption rate of ammo when in combat
Cxf = X's consumption rate of food
Cya = Y's consumption rate of ammo when in combat
Cyf = Y's consumption rate of food




pxa(t) = fraction of X's pipeline capacity allocated for
aramo
pxc(t) = fraction of X's pipeline capacity allocated for
investment
pxf(t) = fraction of Y's pipeline capacity allocated for
food
pya(t) = fraction of Y's pipeline capacity allocated for
ammo
pyc(t) = fraction of Y's pipeline capacity allocated for
investment
rxl = rate of reinforcing main battle force by X
ryl = rate of reinforcing main battle force at Y
rx3 = rate of reinforcing pipeline defense force of X
ry3 = rate of reinforcing pipeline defense force of Y
rx4 = rate of reinforcing pipeline attack force of X
ry4 = rate of reinforcing pipeline attack force of Y
2. Differential Equations for the Combat Dynamics
In this section differential equations are developed
for the rate of change of each of the force and supply levels
A Lanchester "square-law" attrition process (i.e. attrition-





This equation states that the time rate of change of the
X main battle force is proportional to the Y main battle
24

force and to the rate of reinforcement, rxl(t). The function
-i-j. Tr/T -aSya(t) w1 -aSyf(t). ,
of proportionality, K(l-e J y )(l-e J / ), is composed
of the combat effectiveness function of Y's ammo and food
supplies, and the factor K, which stands for any other combat
effectiveness functions which might be included in a more
general model. The constant a is a shape parameter. Both K
and a are taken as numerically equal to one in the remainder
of the discussion. Thus simplified, the equation for main
battle force becomes:
dXl(t) ,, -Sxa(t) w , -Sxf(t) w ,.. T ,. N——
—
'- = - (1-e v y )(l-e v y )Y(t) + rxl(t)






-rxl - rx3 - rx4dt







For Y2=0, ryl + ry3 + ry4 £ 0.
Reserve Forces are depleted at a rate equal to the
algebraic sum of the reinforcement rates to main battle,
pipeline attack and pipeline defense forces. If the reserve
force is totally depleted, transfers between the fighting
forces may be made, or forces may be withdrawn from the
25

fighting forces to the reserve force. Recall that rxl, rx2,




Sya(t) )(l-e~Syf(t) )Y4(t) + rx3(t) (X3>0)




Sxa(t) )(l-e Sxf(t) )X4(t) + ry3(t) (Y3>0)




- S y a ( t ))(l-e-Syf(t) )Y3(t) + rx4(t) (X4>0)dt






Sxa(t) )(l-e Sxf(t) )X3(t) + ry4(t) (Y4>0)






















^£1 = pycQ(t) (X4(t)<Y3(t))
These equations state that the pipeline capacity is destroyed
at a rate proportional to the net amount of force deployed
against it, and is rebuilt at a rate proportional to the
amount of capacity allocated for capital goods. When the
pipeline is defended more heavily than it is attacked, it
is assumed that no capacity attrition occurs.







•Cxa(Xl(t) + X3(t) + X4(t)) + pxaP(t)
=




dt -Cyf(Y(t)) + pyfQ(t),
where X(t) = Xl(t) + X2(t) + X3(t) + X4(t); similarly for Y(t)
The foregoing differential equations describe mathemat-
ically the combat and logistics dynamics of the model scenario




pxc, and ryl, ry3, ry4
,
pya, pyf, pyc are variables which can
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be controlled by the X and Y force commanders respectively.
Through these variables, which are reinforcement (or
withdrawal) rates and pipeline capacity allocations, the
force commanders inject command decisions into the model.
Thus these variables are called decision variables.
3. Objective Function
The objective function is a mathematical expression
of the payoff, or results, of a battle or single play
through of the model. The objective function should be a
mathematical expression of the objective of the combat. From
the standpoint of the X commander, for example, the survivors
of the Y forces would be of negative value.
Care must be taken in the construction of the objective
function to prevent an unrealistic situation from developing
in the model. For example, from inspection of Figure 2 and
the combat dynamics differential equations, it is evident
that a possible path of evolution of the scenario is for one
or the other, or both, commanders to direct all of his forces
to the pipeline attack and defense forces; leaving no
reserves and no main battle force. This is an unrealistic
event in most combat situations. To prevent this outcome
from occurring, the objective function must have the character-
istic of forcing the force commanders to maintain as large
main battle force as possible, on his own side, and minimize
that of the enemy. This is done by assigning a positive
value to XI survivors at the end of the battle, and a neg-




If desired and if appropriate in the scenario being
analyzed, a value may be placed on the reserve forces also.
When the objective is to win the main battle, the forces
used for pipeline defense and attack will be allocated by
the force commander to his best advantage such that he can
win the main battle. Therefore no pipeline defense or attack
forces are included in the payoff function. It is considered
unrealistic in most cases to assign a payoff for large supply
levels existing at the end of the battle. The supplies
are used as tools for attaining the objective, but are not
objectives in themselves. Thus supply levels are not
included in the objective function presented here.
For the X commander, then, a possible expression for his
objective is for him to maximize X1(T) and minimize Y1(T),
where T denotes the time of the end of battle. T may be given
or may be determined from the model itself. Formally, the
X commander will:





= 1, 3, 4; j = a,f ,c
Subject to: (1) combat dynamics
(2) stopping rule
Ml, M2 and Nl, N2 are value coefficients assigned to the
X and the Y survivors respectively.
4
.
. Battle Termination Conditions
The battle termination conditions, which will be
called a "stopping rule" are conditions which when reached
29

mean the battle is over. If one of the forces becomes
annihilated, for example, the battle is over. However, so
far in the model, there are no restrictions on the values of
the main battle force levels; that is, there is nothing to
prevent Xl(t) from taking on negative values. The model
could continue "running" beyond the point where realistically
the battle should stop. In order to prevent this, some
realistic conditions are specified which, if met, stop the
problem.
If either force depletes either ammo or food supplies,
the battle should end. If either main battle force is
annihilated, the battle is terminated. If the use of
"breakpoints" is desired in the model, such as a maximum
number or percentage of casualities before surrender or
withdrawal, the battle force stopping rule is easily
modified. The reduction of a force pipeline capacity to zero
is not a va]id stopping rule; with sufficient supply inventory
the. possibility of the affected force still being able to
win the battle should be considered.
One possible set of battle termination conditions is the
following. The occurrence of one or more of these conditions









5 . Decision Variables :
The decisions available to each force commander to
achieve optimal results are: whether or not to reinforce or
withdraw troops from each of the main battle force, pipeline
defense force, and pipeline attack force, i.e., troop alloca-
tion; and how much of his available pipeline capacity is to
be used for each group or class of supplies, i.e., logistics
allocation. Each of the reinforcement rates may be selected
from values between maximum (reinforcement) and minimum
(withdrawal) rates. (Note that for example rxl < means X's
main battle force is withdrawing to the reserve force). These
limiting values are input to the model.
Logistics allocations are made by selecting the alloca-
tion fractions pxa, pxf, and pxc such that each allocation
fraction is non-negative, and the sum of the allocation
fractions does not exceed unity.
For ease of reference, the complete listing of the model
equations, objective function, stopping rule and initial
values is given in Appendix A.
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IV. AN EXAMPLE OF USE OF THE MODEL
A. EXAMPLE PROBLEM
The purpose of this thesis is to formulate a mathematical
model of combat in which supply and logistics considerations
are explicitly incorporated. The importance of supplies to
the outcome of a battle or campaign has been discussed
previously. This model can be used to explore various
tactics and command decisions in situations where supplies
and resupply capacity, as well as reserve forces and rein-
forcement rates, are of concern to the decision maker. The
model is extremely flexible; it can be modified, expanded, or
simplified to fit a great many situations.
The general model formulated above is a differential
game where both commanders are free to make decisions. There
appears to be little hope of developing analytic results in
this general two-sided case. In order to develop a feel
for the consequences of such a model a simplified version
was considered. In this special case, optimization of the
combat dynamics through application of optimal control theory
has been considered by LCDR R. Powers at the Naval Postgraduate
School. This special case was considered in order to provide
Powers with inputs for the determination of the optimal
policy from among extremal candidates.
An extremal is a trajectory on which the necessary condi-
tions of optimality are satisfied everywhere in time.
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The following scenario describes the problem of interest.
Force X has a main battle force and a reserve force. Force Y
has only a main battle force. Force X has a logistics pipeline
Force Y does not. Force X used only one group of supplies,
which are used only by troops in combat. Figure 3 depicts
the situation. Note that no pipeline defense or attack forces
are employed.
The problem may be stated in mathematical terms as:




















X-^t) = 0, Y2(T) = 0, S(T) < 0.
The following points should be noted in this submodel:
all pipeline capacity is allocated to combat supplies and
the attrition-rate coefficients are taken to be constants.
The importance of supply constraints appears in the stopping








As stated above, optimal tactics for X have been studied
by LCDR Robert Powers of Naval Postgraduate School via
modern optimal control theory. The author developed a
digital computer program to compute the value of the criterion
functional (i.e., objective function) for various extremal
policies developed in Powers' research. (The determination
of an optimal policy here follows the general method outlined
by Taylor in [Ref. 10] (see also [Ref. 11] ). With initial
values of XI , X 2 S, a, b, and c given, trajectories of the X
and Y force levels over time were computed. These trajector-
ies are presented in Figures 4 and 5.
B. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
From the curves in Figure 4, it is apparent that in the
case where rxl = +10.0, the X force annihilates the Y force.
In the case where rxl = -10.0, XI force goes to zero, but
the X2 force increases to 111. The Y force decreases from
50 to 33. Which value of rxl is optimal depends on the
values assigned to the survivors. For the case where
Ml = M2 = N = 1 .
,
rxl = 10.0 is optimal. In this case the
X force commander should immediately reinforce his main
battle force to achieve a victory, provided supplies do
not become a binding constraint. In the problem above, the
initial supply level was chosen so as not to be constraining,
by determining the length of battle, and choosing initial
supply level greater than the consumption rate times the
initial force level times the length of the battle. If





























force commander should commit as many forces as possible
to the main battle force until the supply level becomes
close to zero, and then maintain XI at a level such that
supply consumption equals rate of resupply.
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V . ANALYSIS OF THE MODEL USING
"STEADY STATE" CONDITIONS
An analytical approach which can be used to study this
model is taken from a Naval Ordnance Laboratory analytical
model of a mining campaign [Ref. 12]. This approach, which
we will call "steady state" analysis, results from imagining
the following state of affairs in the model scenario: both
the X and Y force commanders find that a stalemate exists.
Neither X nor Y is winning the main battle, and neither
side is building up or running down supply levels. Both
sides have no reserve forces (or perhaps reinforcements
from outside the model) sufficiently adequate to compensate
for combat attrition which is taking place.
When this "steady state" condition exists, all time
derivaties are zero, and quantities which are indicated as
functions of time are constants. The mathematics is now
simplified significantly. In order to visualize this method











= -bXl(t) + ryl =
Then rxl = aYl(t) and ryl = bXl(t)
rvlLet R =
-f-j be a figure of merit, which has the property
that it is a single number which increases as the situation
becomes more favorable to X, and decreases as the situation
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becomes more favorable to Y. In this example, if rxl , the
rv]
rate at which X reinforces XI, decreases the ratio —~
increases and thus R increases. Intuitively, we would expect
that if X could increase his combat effectiveness against Y,
i.e. increase the attrition-rate coefficient b, it would be
favorable to X. To see that our intuition is correct, write
n _ ryl . bXl(t)
rxl aYl(t)
If we consider b as being a variable, and take the partial
derivative of R with respect to b, we obtain ttt- = ^,A ,
L
» .8b aYl(t)
Since a,Xl(t) and Yl(t) are all non-negative numbers, we see
3R
that "jyj^O which means that an increase in b will result in
an increase in R, as expected.
To apply this analysis to the general model developed in
this thesis, we must consider that X2 and Y2 , the reserve
forces, are "outside the model" because if any of the combat
forces are being reinforced (as they must be if they are
taking casualties and the force levels remain constant, or




zero. With this minor modification, we can set all other
time derivatives equal to zero. For a figure of merit, let
us define R as before, in terms of reinforcement rates. The
total reinforcement rate for Y is ryl + ry3 + ry4 = ry
;
similarly for X. Thus R = ^ = ry l * ry ^ * TYt We seerx rxl + rx3 + rx4
that anything which reduces the X reinforcement rate, or
increases the Y reinforcement rate, increases R and is more
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favorable to X. Note that R can be interpreted as the
casualty exchange ratio, since in steady state all casualties
, , . . casualty rate of Y
are replaced, and thus R = casualty rate of x '
From the combat dynamics equations (see Appendix A), with
time derivatives set equal to zero, we obtain:
rx
rx
1 = (l- e
-Sya(t) )(l-e-Syf(t) )Yl(t)
3 = ( 1-e
Sya(t) )(i- e Syf(t) )Y3(t) and similarly for
rx4 , ryl, ry3, ry4 . From these equations, one obtains:
R
(l_e Sxa(t) )(i- e Sxf(t) )(Xl(t) + X3(t) + X4(t))
(l-e"Sya(t) )(l-e"Syf(t) )(Yl(t) + Y3(t) + Y4(t))
Suppose that the X commander now has an opportunity to
increase his pipeline capacity by using some of his present
capacity to obtain some capital goods. He is presently
using his pipeline for only food and ammo, and thus must take
some capacity away from one supply group or the other (or
possibly both). Which group should provide the capacity for
capital goods? One way to approach this problem is to deter-
mine the change on R with a change in both Sxa and Sxf , by
taking partial derivatives of R with respect to Sxa and Sxf.
-Sxa( t
)
In this example, from the symmetry of the terms (1-e )
—Sxf ( t
)
and (1-e ' v ; ) we see by inspection that these partial
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derivatives will be equal with equal values of Sxa and Sxf.
Recall from the discussion of the construction of these
attrition rate coefficients, however, that there was a shape
parameter, a, which we had assumed to be numerically equal
to one. With a different shape parameter for food and for
ammo, then, the partial derivatives will have different
values. After taking the partial derivatives and evaluating
each of them using the existing supply and force levels, a
comparison is made between them to see which is smaller.
Since supplies are being taken away, and this will obviously
decrease R, the supply group which decreases R by the least
amount should be chosen.
In this manner, the X commander will temporarily decrease
his combat effectiveness and increase his casualty rate, but
in the least harmful way, in order to increase his pipeline
capacity. After his capital goods have arrived and are
installed to increase his pipeline capacity, he performs a
similar analysis to determine whether to use his additional
capacity for food or ammo or both.
The X commander must be careful in this type of analysis
and decision process, however. By temporarily decreasing
his resupply rate of ammo, for example, he is taking the
model out of the steady state condition. He will be using
ammo supplies faster than they will be replaced and he must
be sure to have sufficient stock on hand to cover this
temporary shortage. In addition, as lower and lower levels
of ammo are reached, the partial derivatives must be
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re-evaluated and compared at these new supply levels, in
order to see if the change in R is less with respect to a
change in ammo than it is with respect to a change in food.
If it is not, the commander will want to allocate more of






-s , which implies an optimal allocation.
aoXa d oX
I
(For a short discussion on optimal allocation, see Ref . 13)
The above example is presented as a sample of the type of
insight which can be obtained using this model and steady
state analysis techniques. For a more detailed description
of the application of steady state analysis to a Lanchester-




The purpose of this thesis was to formulate a mathematical
model of combat in which logistics were taken into consider-
ation. The model developed is broad enough in scope to be
applicable in a large number of situations. While a closed
form analytical "solution" to the model may not be found,
numerical results via finite difference methods may be
generated using a digital computer. Using this method, one
may run the model with various combinations of decision
variable values, and by comparing the results, gain insight
into which decisions are better. In certain simplified cases,
such as the example provided, an optimal strategy may be
determined using the methodology of optimal control theory.
Finally, insight into a combat situation may be gained using
the "steady state" analysis techniques previously discussed.
Although the steady state analysis will not yield the time
relationships of the variables in the model, much can be
learned in a qualitiative way about the nature of a combat
situation in which logistics must be considered, and optimal
allocation of pipeline capacity may be determined. Also,
from the steady state analysis, one may gain insight into
the trade-off between casualty rates and supply levels, by
evaluating the partial derivatives of R (casualty exchange
ratio) with respect to ammo and food supply levels.
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VII. NEED FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
It was previously mentioned in Section II that the
actual functional form of the logistics dependent combat
effectiveness, or attrition-rate coefficient, is an opera-
tions research problem. Construction of these functions,
perhaps from historical data, would make this model more
applicable to real world situations.
We have seen an example of solution of a much-simplified
submodel using optimal control theory.
As more research is done in this field of mathematics,
more generalized versions of this model will perhaps be
solvable for an optimal strategy.
An immediate follow-up to this formulation would be the
writing of a digital computer program for the general model,
as contained in Appendix A, for use in comparing various
tactics and decisions for a particular scenario. Such a
program might be of value as a teaching aid for future





This appendix contains the mathematical description of
the Lanchester-type model of combat with logistics consider-
ations. For derivations and explanation of equations, refer
to Section III.









(T) - N-J^T) - N2Y 2 (T)); i = 1,3,4r.,p. j = a, f ,
c
xi ' K xj ° ' '
Subject to:
5£> = - (l-e^^d-e^^) Y
l( t) + rxl (t)
dt
= " (i-e"Sxa(t) )d-e-Sxf(t) ) X1 (t) + r (t)
dX2^ t ^ rt^ (t^ rt^
—§7— = -r / ; - r Q ^ L; - r „w (if X2 = , r _ +r Q+r .dt xl x3 x4 v ' xl x3 x4
< 0)






(t) (if Y2 =
,
r -,+r Q+r ,dt yl y3 y4 v ' yl y3 y4
< 0)




























4 (t) - X 3 (t)) + PxcP(t) (for Y4 (t)>Xg(t))
dP(t)
dt
= p P(t)Kxc v ' (for Y4 (t)<X 3 (t))
dQ(t)
dt -ax (X4 (t) - Y 3 (t)) + PxcQ(t) (for X4 (t)>Yg(t))
dQ(t)
dt PycQ(t) (for X 4(t)<Y3 (t))
dSxa(t)
dt Cx^ Xl^ + X3(t) + X4 (t) + pxaP(t)
dSya(t)
dt Cya(Y 1 (t) + Y 3 (t) + Y4 (t)) + P yaQ(t)
dSxf (t)

























X° Y° V° V° n° C\° V ° V° V° V°
-i >
Ao > A o > A4 > ^ > H > jl -i > 2 ' 3 ' 4 '
SO Q O Q O Q O
xa' x f ' y a ' yf
Input Parameters:
K ya' yf yc' yl y3' y4 ' 1' 2' 1' 2
ay, ax, Cxa, Cya, Cxf , Cyf
Decision Variable Constraints
r , min < r , < r , max
xl — xl — xl
r
x3 min i rx3 1 rx3 max
r







p +p„ + p < 1Hxa xf xc —
Stopping Rule:
X, = 0, or Y , = 0, or Sxf = 0, or Sxa = 0, or Sxf = 0,
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